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Abstract: In response to Hirsch’s deflationary arguments, Sider attempts to introduce a special
Ontologese quantifier to preserve the substantivity of fundamental debates in metaphysics. He
claims that this strategy can be effected by two distinct means, one of which is a list of instruc-
tions for metaphysicians, which he argues suffice to give the new quantifier a meaning that carves
nature at the joints. I argue that these instructions will not allow someone to start speaking Onto-
logese if their prior language is sufficiently deviant with respect to it, and that natural languages
may be in just such a position.
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I
THE NOTION OF A SPECIAL ontological language is becoming more commonly
invoked in analytic philosophy, and it is important to raise objections before it
becomes orthodoxy. The most prominent advocate is Sider, who argues that,
although there might be many decent languages for various purposes, only one is
suited to fundamental ontology, namely Ontologese. The structure and vocabulary
of this language are supposed to make it uniquely suited to saying what there is
(although, as we shall see, this statement is somewhat misleading). The issue has
been heatedly debated in a series of papers by Sider and Hirsch; the aim of this arti-
cle is to add to the discussion by posing a problem for one of Sider’s methods of
introducing the Ontologese quantifier. Specifically, I will argue that we cannot,
except in very favourable circumstances, start speaking Ontologese by using one of
Sider’s canonical methods. I will further argue that appeal to “practice” cannot solve
this defect. Thirdly, we see that, under a plausible assumption about linguistic inten-
tions, a parallel problem arises for Sider’s other canonical method of speaking
Ontologese. Finally, I will argue that considerations of context and eligibility are
not jointly sufficient for evading (either version of ) the problem, because if we con-
strue Ontologese as Sider proposes, then neither the speaker nor their interlocutors
will know what their own words mean, which is an intolerable consequence.
Sider concedes that the English quantifiers might not “express fundamental
quantification”. However, he does think that we can introduce, by stipulation, a
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quantifier that lacks the deficiencies of the English idiom (Sider, 2011,
pp. 171–172). Ontologese, according to Sider, is the language of the “metaphys-
ics room”, in contrast to the messy “marketplace” of ordinary language. To make
sure that everyone is speaking correctly, Sider gives two distinct methods of
introducing the new language:
1. The Official Method: Stipulate that your existential quantifier has the
most natural, eligible, fundamental, joint-carving meaning in the (seman-
tic) vicinity of the English expression ‘there is’. If there is such a meaning,
the proposal succeeds and we all speak Ontologese (Sider, 2008, p. 412).
2. The Nominalistic Method: For those who are unwilling to quantify over
meanings, as in the official method, Sider provides a list of nominalized
instructions for speaking the language:
Instructions for Introducing Ontologese: i) introduce a symbol, ‘9’, with
the grammar of the familiar existential quantifier; ii) stipulate that no philo-
sophically contentious sentences count toward your use of ‘9’—only its core
inferential role counts; iii) have the concept of a restriction on a quantifier and
explicitly disavow all such restrictions; iv) intend by using ‘9’ to speak as fun-
damentally as possible; explain what this means by contrasting your austere
intentions for ‘9’ with your rough and ready everyday use of English quantifi-
cational language such as ‘there are many ways to win this chess match’,
‘Jones and I have nothing in common’, and so on. (Sider, 2008, p. 415)
The hope is that any ontological debates, even if they are non-substantive in English,
are substantive in Ontologese (Sider, 2008, p. 415). As its name suggests, the offi-
cial method is Sider’s position, though he claims that the nominalistic method is also
viable (Sider, 2008, pp. 415–416). The official method is the subject of much dis-
cussion in the literature, but here I will focus on the nominalistic method.
Ontologese is supposed to be a “better” language than English, when it comes
to ontological matters, since its quantificational structure much better matches
that of The World. It looks like Sider has given his metaphysically-inclined col-
leagues a means for debating any claims of the form ‘there is Φ’ substantively —
just sit down in the philosophy room, agree to carve at the joints, and let the dis-
agreement begin!
Sider pre-empts a deflationary criticism of this shift to Ontologese. He imagi-
nes a scenario in which a metaphysician makes the following pronouncement:
“by ‘dirt’ I shall mean the element of the periodic table in which trees grow,
which forms mud when combined with water, and which is flattened to make
country roads” (Sider, 2011, p. 172). Of course, the problem with this speech is
that no such element of the periodic table exists. Sider (2011, p. 172) imagines
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that the deflationist will be dissatisfied with the stipulated quantifier for analogous
reasons –– you cannot carve at the joints, because there are no joints at which to
carve! However, whether the dirt speech is successful depends on whether there
exists a particular element of the periodic table. But logical joints, whatever they
may be, are not supposed to be elements of Sider’s ontology (2011, pp. 12–14).
So it cannot be that the success of introducing the new quantifier is determined in
the very same way as the dirt proposal. Indeed my objection to Sider’s position is
not that there aren’t such logical joints;1 rather the objection occurs at the meta-
level in denying that any sense has been given to the phrase ‘logical joints’ (and
related terminology) that allows us to shift from speaking English to speaking
Ontologese by using the nominalized instructions. I also hope that this will shed
some light on why the official method is not promising either.
II
My central objection to the nominalistic method of introducing Ontologese is that
obeying the instructions given is consistent with failing to speak Ontologese at
all. As a secondary criticism, even if someone were actually speaking it, then no
one (including the speaker) could determine that this was so. Of course, this situ-
ation is in a sense quite normal; if I were to “read” out loud from a textbook in
an unfamiliar language, there is a sense in which I would be speaking the lan-
guage, albeit poorly, without knowing what language I am speaking. The case of
Ontologese is distinct, though, in that it might be impossible to determine whether
or not we are speaking it, and I take it that this problem is much more severe.2
With respect to the nominalistic strategy, I think we can show directly that it
results in scenarios in which the speaker is speaking a language and that this fact
is in-principle unknowable. Consider an example of someone who would deny
that there was a language which was uniquely privileged with respect to meta-
physical discourse, Putnam’s (1987, p. 77) cosmopolitan. She is equally fluent in
two different ways of talking about the world, and at different times, uses differ-
ent “logical primitives” or “notions of object” (Putnam, 1987, p. 71). But Sider
wants her to speak Ontologese, so that she can appreciate all of the high-stakes
metaphysical debates that she can currently only see as being verbal. I will follow
1 I am, however, sceptical.
2 In the case of the official strategy, if there are suitable logical joints, but we had not established the
fact, executing the strategy would result in a scenario in which we did not know which language we were
speaking. Whether this difficulty would be accidental, as in the textbook case, or a deeper issue alto-
gether depends on our ability to verify Sider’s thesis about the logical structure of reality. As a thorough
discussion would take us too far afield, I can only hope that the reader is suspicious of our ability to con-
clusively establish such a contentious philosophical thesis.
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Button (2013, p. 214) in calling her ‘Poly’. Though our dialectical strategies will
diverge, for now the kind of argument that Button levels against his “hardcore
realist” works just as well against the realist who wants to speak Ontologese via
the nominalistic method.
Suppose Poly is fluent in two languages, which embody different philosophical
perspectives on the existence of composite objects. Let one language be Nihilish,
the speakers of which say all the sorts of things mereological nihilists say, and
the other be Universalish, the speakers of which say all the kinds of things we
would expect to hear from mereological universalists when it comes to the exis-
tence of composite objects. When she is speaking either language, she is happy
to regard as true what typical speakers of the language so regard. Since she hap-
pily flip-flops between these languages, Poly is one day a nihilist, and the next a
universalist. Now, suppose that Sider gives Poly the instruction sheet. As
required, she very sincerely forms the intention to mean the most metaphysically
excellent meaning in the vicinity of all her logical terminology, and speaks in the
most strict, literal and unrestricted way she can. No trickery is intended on
her part.
She tries her very hardest, thinks about fundamentality and the nature of quan-
tification, and contrasts examples of very natural predicates with disjunctive or
gerrymandered variants. Finally, she thinks she is on to something, and comes to
believe that the best description of the world must be couched in a language
whose quantifier was unrestricted and fundamental, and which uses the most per-
fectly natural meaning of ‘there is’. By the end of the day, she has renounced uni-
versalism and denies sentences like ‘there are tables’, ‘there are trout-turkeys’,
and similar. Sider can go home satisfied — it seems as though Poly can now
speak Ontologese. Whether or not she is correct in her mereological views, she
appears to have started speaking in the right way to do fundamental metaphysics.
Although we cannot conclusively rule out the danger that she is employing a
deviant interpretation of the language in question, she certainly sounds like other
metaphysicians do when they speak on fundamental matters.
However, there is a snag. The next day, Poly starts speaking Universalish,
rather than what she yesterday took to be Ontologese — even though she is in
the metaphysics room! In an attempt to correct her mistake, Sider reads out the
list of instructions again, and Poly once more disavows deviant quantification and
promises never to use gerrymandered predicates ever again. The problem is that,
while she is speaking Universalish, the quantifier that looks the most unrestricted
is the one that ranges over arbitrary composite objects, and so despite her inten-
tion to speak Ontologese, she assents to all kinds of bizarre sentences, like ‘there
are trout-turkeys’ and ‘there are in-cars’.
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The purpose of this story is to illustrate the following: as far as we know,
everyday English might carve nowhere near nature’s joints. If so, obeying the
instructions provided in the nominalistic method is insufficient to take a speaker
from their non-joint-carving language to Ontologese. Poly, in her Universalish
moments, cannot see that she is using (what in her Nihilish moments she would
call) an extravagant quantifier rather than the most fundamental one. The reason
that she cannot see it is because ‘fundamental’ is an established term in Univer-
salish with a meaning that does not match (what Sider argues is) the most funda-
mental meaning in the vicinity. So when, in Universalish, she intends to speak as
“fundamentally” as possible she will not intend the same thing as she did the day
before when she intended to speak in the most “fundamental” way, where ‘funda-
mental’ is an established term in Nihilish. For the Universalish-speaker, it is per-
fectly natural to say ‘there are trout-turkeys’; to the Nihilish-speaker, however,
the utterance is aberrant.
Importantly, Sider does not deny this point; indeed he considers it an open pos-
sibility that adopting a new quantifier requires altering the meaning of every pred-
icate (presumably including ‘fundamental’, ‘natural’ and ‘eligible’) (Sider, 2014,
p. 571, n. 8). So, if our ordinary strict-and-literal quantification in English does
not match the structure of Ontologese, then our intention to speak in conformity
with the instructions given by Sider will be the wrong intention, for the same rea-
son that Poly, when speaking Universalish, had the wrong intentions when she
executed the instruction sheet. So there is no way of determining whether the lan-
guage that anyone, including oneself, is currently speaking is actually Ontologese
or not.3
There is one important respect in which the story might be misleading. Typical
speakers of Universalish will go about uttering sentences expressing mereological
principles such as that of unrestricted composition. But isn’t ‘if x and y exist, and
are non-identical, then their sum exists’ a “philosophically contentious” sentence,
which Sider specifically instructs us to disregard as contributing to the meaning
of the quantifier in favour of “core inferential” considerations only? If so, then
Universalish could not be Ontologese, and the case poses no problem for Sider at
all. Similarly, if speaking Nihilish trivially entails the truth of ‘there are no trees’,
then that language could not be Ontologese either. It is not that mereological uni-
versalism and mereological nihilism could not possibly be true when expressed in
Ontologese; rather the principles underpinning such views could not determine
3 Of course, in some cases, two languages would share a meaning for terms like ‘fundamental’ and
‘joint-carving’. So my argument is not that the attempt to speak Ontologese via the nominalist method
will always backfire in the sense illustrated, but rather that it might do so, and if it does we will be none
the wiser.
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the interpretation of the Ontologese quantifier. After all, the introduction of Onto-
logese by Sider is designed to make sure that metaphysical disputes are substan-
tive, not to automatically solve them.4
In response, I would stress that delimiting the “core inferential role” of logical
vocabulary is just as philosophically contentious as determining the principles of
mereology. We could re-cast the above story, with Poly as one day a realist, and
the other an anti-realist (in Dummett’s (1978) sense) with respect to some
domain. In this case, rather than flip-flopping over metaphysical principles, Poly
could simply flip-flop between classical and intuitionistic logic. Such flip-flopping
would still carry existential implications, and yet the dispute between classical
and intuitionistic logic is precisely a dispute about the inferential role of the logi-
cal vocabulary, quantifiers included. In short, the core inferential role of the quan-
tifier is just as philosophically contentious as plenty of metaphysical-looking
semantic rules are. So, if the core inferential role of the English quantifier is suffi-
ciently distinct from the role that the Ontologese quantifier ought to have, then
when we intend to consider only the core inferential role in stipulating the seman-
tics of a new quantifier, we will not form the right intention after all.
It is worth stressing that Poly’s inability to execute the instructions properly is
not an ordinary case of interpretative deviancy. There might, for instance, be a
person for whom Sider’s instructions read like a recipe for mushroom bisque, and
yet that is no threat to Sider’s position.5 Quite so; but the reason there is no threat
is that if there were such a person, then an attempt to execute the instructions
would be an attempt (perhaps unsuccessful) to cook up a delicious mushroom
bisque. Importantly, Sider could determine that they had not understood the
instructions correctly, whereas in the Poly case she might have gone for an entire
career professing to speak Ontologese but failing to do so, and no one, not Sider
and not even herself, would have had a clue that she had misunderstood.
Hirsch (2008, pp. 520–521) offers an argument that bears some similarity to
the one presented above. He imagines a character who sincerely intends to speak
the world’s oldest language, and then goes on to speak fluently in Hebrew. Hirsch,
quite rightly, insists that we are correct to characterize them as speaking Hebrew,
rather than claim that they are doing a terrible job of speaking Sumerian. Simi-
larly, philosophers might well intend to speak Ontologese on their way into the
philosophy room without actually managing to do so. Sider (2014, p. 567)
responds by pointing out a dis-analogy between the two cases, namely that the
English-speaker already understands the lexicon, grammar and much of the
semantics of Ontologese (since it is supposed to vary as little as possible from
4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
5 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this amusing formulation of the problem.
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English), whereas the Hebrew-speaker is in the same position as anyone else
(at least, anyone else who is not an accomplished Cuneiformist) in being ignorant
of Sumerian lexicon, grammar and semantics.
The utility of bringing Poly into the picture, then, is that she understands both
of the languages in question perfectly well, cutting Sider’s response to Hirsch out
of the picture. Moreover, Poly presents a more fundamental problem for Sider
than does Hirsch’s character. In the Hebrew–Sumerian case, what is missing is a
simple piece of knowledge, namely that Sumerian is an older language than
Hebrew. If Hirsch’s character had known this, the speaker could have recalibrated
their intentions with their verbal behaviour in an unproblematic way either by
attempting to speak Sumerian or intending to speak Hebrew. This is clearly not
the position in which Poly finds herself. Meaning, unlike age, is a feature “inter-
nal” to a language. Hirsch’s character could discover their mistake in Hebrew
(by reading about Sumerian, perhaps), whereas nothing Poly could do ought to
convince her to assent to sentences like “fundamental’ does not mean
fundamental’.
III
There are two routes that Sider might take in order to respond to the kind of argu-
ment put forward in the last section. A first strategy might be to concede that
mere obedience to the instruction sheet is indeed insufficient for aspiring meta-
physicians to learn Ontologese. Sider (2004, p. 680) has argued that with respect
to English, we can use a method that he calls “innocent coaching” in order to see
that metaphysicians’ locutions are not so strange after all. Since Sider is increas-
ingly relying on his Ontologese theory to respond to deflationism, rather than
focus on the metasemantics of English (Sider, 2014, p. 565), perhaps the coach-
ing proposal can be reformulated as a method for learning Ontologese without
commitment to reified meanings. We could perhaps come to grasp the Ontologese
quantifier by using the sign that is explicitly introduced for it, and have our use
of it corrected and encouraged by metaphysicians during debates in the philoso-
phy room until our behaviour suggests that we have hit upon the intended
meaning.
The problem is that there are no means by which the would-be metaphysicians
can be effectively coached. Part ii of Sider’s instructions is the stipulation that no
philosophically contentious sentence is to count toward the interpretation of the
Ontologese quantifier. In other words, the only uses of the quantifier that go into
determining its meaning are those that are philosophically uncontentious. It is
pretty clear that this amounts to a blanket ban on use determining meaning, since,
as we saw, even the core inferential role of the quantifier is the subject of
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philosophical controversy. Furthermore, since there are no philosophical problems
that have paradigm solutions that can be intersubjectively verified by tutors and
peers, as there are in science and mathematics, all Sider has to go on when coach-
ing his students is their avowal to be obeying the quantifier-introduction instruc-
tions. But as we saw, obedience to the instructions is consistent with not speaking
Ontologese.
It is worth noting that this is the reason that Ontologese theorists cannot fall
back on a similar proposal, namely that ‘there is’, ‘fundamental’, ‘natural’, etc.
are technical terms of Ontologese, which are to be learned through actual debate
in the metaphysics room, and through careful study of examples present in Sider’s
book and elsewhere. Unlike more ordinary theoretical terms, the Ontologese
‘there is’ has no cases of use from which to learn its meaning, since I take it that
even Sider’s stock examples of the fundamental (such as the red/blue world;
Sider, 2011, pp. 1–2) are just as philosophically contentious as anything else, and
are thus ruled out from contributing to the meaning of the Ontologese quantifier-
expression. Furthermore, if these examples are in English, then it is unclear how
they could illuminate the meaning of the Ontologese, rather than the English,
expressions. This is because those expressions of Ontologese have English coun-
terparts the meanings of which we have prior understanding of; for example, the
Ontologese quantifier does not mean existence, but something else of which we
have no independent understanding. And if the examples are in Ontologese, then
they plainly cannot help in facilitating the understanding of Ontologese, any more
than a monoglot English speaker can learn the meaning of ‘Es gibt’ by looking it
up in a German schoolbook.
Rather than focus on coaching, Sider’s later account of what uniquely fixes the
correct interpretation of our words in the metaphysics room is that The World
itself does the fixing. Specifically, the meanings of our expressions, including log-
ical vocabulary, are fixed because some “candidate meanings” for those expres-
sions are more eligible than others.
Eligibility considerations are supposed to function as a kind of semantic
“anchor” that allows one to introduce a term by a definite description of its
intended meaning in a manner akin to an ostensive definition (Sider, 2011, p. 75).
The procedure would be to define the meaning, if any, of the Ontologese
quantifier-expression as the most eligible meaning in the vicinity of ‘there is’.
The extent of this “vicinity” is determined by us when we fix the grammatical
and inferential role of the expression. In this case, we have a guarantee that the
meaning of ‘9’ will be a quantifier-meaning, assuming that there is some meaning
close enough to satisfy the definite description.
Given the explicit quantification over meanings here, it is clear that this is not
going to be a nominalistically acceptable strategy. Indeed, it is simply the official
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strategy outlined in section I. Although it is an importantly separate strategy, I
think the arguments earlier deployed against the nominalistic strategy also serve
to cast some doubt on the official strategy too.
It seems to me that considerations of eligibility will get Sider no further toward
us speaking Ontologese than did his original instruction sheet. Suppose that Poly
is speaking a language where the meaning of ‘eligible’ is so deeply ineligible that
its meaning is nowhere near the meaning of the Ontologese expression ‘eligible’.
If this happens, then there is simply no eligible meaning in the vicinity of her
expression for her to mean, so her intention to speak with the most “eligible”
meanings in the vicinity of her words will not be the same intention that Sider
has when he intends to speak eligibly.
So just as with the instruction sheet, Poly will not form the right intention when
she intends her words to have (what she takes to be) the most eligible meanings,
since her understanding of ‘eligible’ will be intimately tied up with her (deviant)
understanding of ‘fundamental’, ‘natural’, and related expressions. Hence, when
she intends to use (what she takes to be) the most eligible meaning of ‘there is’,
she will not express what the Ontologese speaker does by using ‘existence’, but
rather the deviant quantificational concept she had to begin with. So the most that
eligibility considerations will do for Sider is show that someone speaking a lan-
guage with a sufficiently eligible meaning of ‘eligible’ will successfully shift to
speaking Ontologese when they attempt to execute the official strategy.
The reason that I am more hesitant to endorse this kind of response to the offi-
cial strategy than in the case of the nominalist strategy is that it seems to rely on
a contentious thesis about intentions. In the nominalist case, we have already
taken a certain degree of semantic ascent; since the instructions are sentences
written in a language, in order to (deliberately) obey the instructions we need to
form the intention that we conform to what we understand the sentences expres-
sing them to require. In contrast, the official strategy simply requires that some-
one have a particular intention, not that they understand the instruction to have a
particular intention. In consequence, the argument of the previous paragraph does
not work unless there is some close connection between the having of a linguistic
intention and the ability to express it. If such a connection holds, then the inten-
tions that the official strategy requires one to have in order to speak Ontologese
will only be available to those who already speak a language that is close enough
to Ontologese that they can express such an intention.
In this case, the official strategy would, like the nominalistic strategy, fail to
shift “deviant” speakers from their starting language into Ontologese. The argu-
ment does not rely on an assumption as strong as thinking that all our intentions
must be articulable. Rather, it relies on the assumption that one can only intend
to mean Φ if one can either already express Φ, or can gesture to the correct usage
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of an expression for Φ in someone else’s linguistic practice. I don’t have an
explicit argument that this principle is correct, but it strikes me as plausible. In
any case, the argument against the specifically nominalist strategy that it the main
focus of this paper goes through untouched by such considerations.
Hirsch (2008, pp. 521–522) offers an argument for a similar conclusion; how-
ever, his argument relies on Sider accepting two contentious principles about how
joint-carving is supposed to work, principles to which Sider (2014, pp. 569–570)
has argued that he is not committed. To some extent, then, this argument can be
taken to be an improvement on Hirsch’s insofar as it requires no such principles.
At this point, I take myself to have shown that neither written instructions, nor
time spent in the metaphysics room, offers a nominalistically acceptable strategy
for speaking Ontologese, since both of these procedures can be faithfully fol-
lowed by someone who cannot speak Ontologese. Further, if linguistic intentions
are somewhat tied to our ability to express them, then eligibility considerations
are also insufficient for a speaker to speak Ontologese, unless she was already
speaking Ontologese, or a sufficiently similar language. If so, then she could have
formed the correct intentions when executing the instructions, because the vicin-
ity of her expressions such as ‘fundamentally’ would include the referentially
“magnetic” meaning of the Ontologese expression ‘fundamentally’.
That said, we have yet to be given a reason to think that quantifiers in natural
language have a sufficiently close meaning. Indeed, the belief that natural lan-
guages do not have quantifiers suitable for fundamental metaphysics is the key
motivation for moving to Ontologese, so we may indeed suspect that the mean-
ings are not sufficiently close. Some Ontologese theorists, such as Dorr (2005),
are inclined to say that we have been speaking fundamentally all along (at least,
that we have done so in the metaphysics room). This position is interestingly dis-
tinct from Sider’s, but is not my concern in this article. Rather, my arguments are
directed specifically at those who, like Sider, want to start speaking a new lan-
guage. And I take it that such people will not think we are already speaking
Ontologese, since this would decisively undermine the motivation for taking up
their own position in the dialectic.
IV
A final option, which is certainly not Sider’s, but that perhaps fits the spirit of his
project, might be to bite the bullet and accept that interlocutors in the metaphysics
room cannot shift to speaking Ontologse via the nominalistic method.6 However, the
6 And perhaps even by the official method as well, if our linguistic intentions are linked to our abilities
of expression and/or ostention as suggested in the last section.
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claim would be that in certain contexts (e.g., when we are not speaking “loosely”)
our expressions refer to the most eligible meaning in the vicinity (in the Ontologese
sense of ‘eligible’), whether we intended them to do so or not. So those in the meta-
physics room, as long as they are all taking the exercise seriously, would all be carv-
ing nature at the joints. This metasemantic picture is somewhat ad hoc, since it has
little independent appeal or motivation, but it might seem that the price is worth pay-
ing for freedom from the kind of deflationary arguments urged by Hirsch and others.
Unfortunately, this merely trades one form of scepticism for another, and will do
nothing to show that fundamental metaphysics is possible in the way that Sider
hopes for. Existential debates would indeed be substantive, but would be radically
defective in a different way. We can assume that we know when we are in the con-
text of the metaphysics room, and so it is guaranteed that we are all speaking the
same language when we do metaphysics. The new problem is that this would make
it impossible for us to know what our own words meant in our mouths, in any non-
trivial sense. Sider has conceded that there are several candidate meanings in the
vicinity of key expressions; after all, that was what prompted the Ontologese idea
in the first place. But how do we find out which of the candidate meanings for
‘exists’ was indeed the most natural one? We will know that all the instances of the
trivial schema ‘The expression ‘Φ’ means Φ’ are true. But we will not be able to
express the meaning of our Ontologese expressions in any more illuminating terms.
A return to Poly’s scenario will help to illustrate the problem. Sider, in English,
pledges to mean the most natural meaning of ‘exists’, and Poly (speaking Univer-
salish) pledges similarly. Thanks to the fact that they are in the metaphysics room,
they know that they both mean the same thing, namely the most fundamental
sense of ‘exists’. Assuming that one of them was already using the most natural
candidate meaning, the question arises as to which one had the most eligible con-
cepts to begin with. Sider will of course think that he got it right, and that Poly’s
prior use of the word ‘exists’ was gerrymandered and unnatural, so that when she
uses the (Ontologese) expression ‘exists’ she means that in the Siderian sense,
and makes all sorts of false claims about the existence of trees. But Poly will no
doubt think that her use was the right one all along, and that Sider is now making
all sorts of false assertions about the non-existence of trees. The reason that they
will think they were right all along is that their previous use of a quantifier-
expression that was not the Ontologese one is all they have to go on when consid-
ering what they might now be meaning, since the instructions, coaching, and so
forth give us no clues as to what we might mean in Ontologese, as I have argued
previously. If Sider and Poly are not so adamant that they know what they mean,
there will be no debate to be had at all, for the same reason that you and I could
not debate the existence of gumberdashers; namely that neither of us know what
‘gumberdashers’ means at all!
© 2018 The Authors. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stifielsen Theoria
11SIDER’S ONTOLOGESE INTRODUCTION INSTRUCTIONS
A more illuminating illustration can be taken from model theory. As Quine
(1964, pp. 211–212) shows, every consistent first-order theory has a model in the
natural numbers, thanks to the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem and Gödel’s arithme-
tization of syntax. We can think of Poly and Sider as in the following position:
they both put forward their own metaphysical theories in order to debate about
them. Sider gives his favoured theory, and Poly the typical Universalish one. In
virtue of the metasemantic picture under consideration, we know that the dispute
is substantive, because all their words mean the most eligible thing they could,
regardless of Poly and Sider’s intentions. So assuming that the theories are consis-
tent, they both have the same interpretation, in the model theoretic sense. How-
ever, neither of them has any means to determine whether or not that
interpretation is the one they intended; indeed for all either of them know the
most eligible interpretation is simply a “Pythagorean” one whose domain is the
natural numbers.
Korman (2015) offers what at first sight may appear to be a similar argument.
He quite rightly insists that, if we do not make the unwarranted assumption that
the Ontologese expression ‘there is’ means the same as its English counterpart,
then we are not in a position to assess the truths of claims about what “exists” in
the Ontologese sense (e.g., Korman, 2015, p. 311). This is importantly distinct
from the line of argument I am urging in this section. Korman’s position, I take
it, is epistemic in character; he writes that “we lose our anchor for assessing the
resultant ontological theses” (Korman, 2015, p. 316), and suggests that new argu-
ments for the Ontologese analogues of standard ontological positions would need
to be looked for. My position, on the other hand, is semantic; I would sooner
claim that we lose our anchor for meaning anything at all by our ontological the-
ses. An expression that could mean anything might as well mean nothing, and
under the picture presently being considered, the existential claims made by Polly
and Sider might mean anything at all, though by construction they mean the same
thing. Moreover, I have argued that we have no reason to expect there to be any
method by which we can offer any further elucidation of the meanings of Onto-
logese expressions. Korman (2015, p. 302) specifically distances himself from
making such semantic proposals, so I take it that our aims and arguments, though
perhaps complementary, are quite properly distinct.
In summary, if we follow the proposal of this section to ensure that all our
metaphysical debates will be substantive, we will have no idea as to what we are
actually arguing about, and so we will not even know what we have said the
world is fundamentally like, let alone know what the world is fundamentally like.
This is also the key to seeing why metaphysicians cannot start speaking Ontolog-
ese merely by semantic deference to Sider. We could say “by ‘joint carving’,
I shall mean whatsoever Sider means by that expression”. But unless Sider can
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explain to us, in English, what he means, the possibility remains that everyone in
the metaphysics room has no idea what their words mean. Unless, of course, we
were already speaking something similar to Ontologese, but as we have seen there
is no reason for Sider to think that this is so, and several reasons for him to
deny it.
V
I have not attempted to show that Ontologese is not a possible language; what I
do hope to have clarified is that suspicion of the notion need not flow from the
belief that there is no special interpretation of our words corresponding to what
the metaphysician wants from a language. Rather, the suspicion can come from a
worry that we have no means of coming to speak a language with such an
interpretation.
Further, I have not argued that no such method can be given. Rather, I have
argued that the nominalistic method embodied in Sider’s instruction sheet fails to
do the job. This is because, if one speaks a language which employs an interpre-
tation which is deviant relative to Ontologese, then one could nevertheless follow
the instructions (by following them in a deviant, though sincere, fashion). Further,
no one (even the speaker) will be able to determine whether they are speaking
Ontologese. This argument, coupled with the stipulation that the use of our meta-
physical terminology does not contribute to Ontologese meaning, shows that we
cannot come to speak Ontologese by immersion in the practice of the metaphys-
ics room either. Therefore executing Sider’s instructions will only result in speak-
ing Ontologese for those who already were; and if an individual carries out the
instructions and is not speaking Ontologese afterwards, no one will be any the
wiser.
This is significant because it shows that metaphysicians who wish to evade
Hirsch-type deflationary arguments cannot do so by invoking Ontologese without
explicit quantification over meanings; a construction with which many philoso-
phers today are deeply uncomfortable. Further, I have argued that the problem
can be extended to Sider’s official method of introducing Ontologese by means of
such quantification if we accept that an intention to mean Φ presupposes either
the ability to articulate Φ or the ability to point to the use of an expression that
successfully means Φ. This strikes me as plausible, given the link between mean-
ing and linguistic practice, though I have no specific argument for it as a general
principle.
Finally, I hope to have shown that it is not an option to fix the nominalistic
strategy (or the official one, if it is indeed beset by a similar problem) by insisting
that we all speak Ontologese regardless of our intentions, or by means of
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semantic deference. To do so is simply to replace the initial worries with equally
severe ones. Since such a metasemantic picture has little independent motivation,
I think it is clear that if we are to introduce Ontologese by stipulation, we must
be able to say something about those meanings in an antecedently understood
language, and to know that we have done so. If I am right, we have been given
no coherent suggestion for how to do this. Indeed, if we cannot do this, then it
was deeply misleading of me to even describe Ontologese as supposedly being
“uniquely suited to saying what there is”, since ‘what there is’ is an ordinary
expression in English, not a special expression in Ontologese.
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